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W .ARD

[39 C.2d

V. JoNES

[L. A. No. 22092. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1952.]

AILEEN MARY WARD et al., Appellants, v. A. B. JONES
et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Officers-Liability-Actions-Filing Claim as Condition

Precedent.-Gov. Code, § 1981, making filing of a claim a
prerequisite to recovery of damages for personal injuries
resulting from negligence or carelessness of a public employer
or employee, applies to actions for wrongful death, an heir
of the deceased being a person injured within the meaning of
such statute.
[2] Id.-Liability-Actions-Pleading.-In wrongful death action
against fellow employees of deceased painter employed by city,
complaint states cause of action based on "negligence" within
the meaning of Gov. Code, § 1981, although the word "wilful"
appears in one allegation against one defendant, where the
same acts are alleged to constitute negligence and carelessness
on the part of all defendants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment of dismissal following order sustaining general demurrer to complaint without leave to amend. Affirmed.
Richard L. Mayers and
Appellants.

Lawr~nce

William Steinberg for

Hay L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Gilmore
'l'illman, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Wendell Mackay and
A. L. Lawson, Deputy City Attorneys, for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is an action for damages for wrongful
death as authorized by section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that "when the death of a
person . . . is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs . . . may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death . . . ''
[1] Death as result of injury as affecting requirement of notice
of claim as condition of municipal liability, note, 64 A.L.R. 1059.
See, also, Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 88 et seq.; Am.Jur., Municipal
Corporations, § 688.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Public Officers, § 66.1.
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:I'he plaintiffs are the widow and minor children of Joseph
T.. Ward, deceased. The complaint, later amended, was filed
on March 29, 1949. The appeal is from a judgment of dismissal of the action following an order sustaining a general
demurrer without leave to amend.
The decedent was a painter employed in the Department
of Water and Power of the City of l1os Angeles. On July
12, 1948, he was a member of a crew of department employees
then engaged in painting an electrical transmission line tower.
This tower supported high tension wires carrying an electrical potential of approximately 130,000 volts. While Ward
and his fellow employees were engaged in the discharge
of their departmental duties he was injured by coming in
contact with a high tension wire and died two days later.
The liability of the employer city was prescribed and limited
by the death benefit provisions of workmen's compensation
laws of the state, and the city is therefore not a party defendant in this action. The defendants were fellow employees
of the decedent.
The complaint alleges that it was extremely hazardous
for any painter to work on the transmission line towers when
the wires were energized ; that reasonable care required:
that the current be turned off while painters worked on the
towers; that neither painters, planks, scaffolding nor rigging,
except of the nonconducting quality, be permitted to come
within 10 feet of the energized wires; that competent electrical mechanics be stationed at all times between the wires
and painters working on the towers, and that painters be required to wear safety belts while so working.
It is also alleged that none of the foregoing precautions
had been taken for a long period of time prior to the accident
which caused Ward's death; that each of the defendants was
aware of this fact, but in neglect and disregard of his duties
.as an employee of the department "carelessly and negli-..__,
gently" failed to take any steps to remedy the situation.
'
The complaint then alleges that the electrical mechanic
assigned to the job insisted that certain precautions be provided to protect the painters from the dangers of the high
t'ension wires but that the defendant 0 'Connor "in wilful,
11,egligent and reckless'' disregard of the safety of members
of said crew, adopted the practice of working and did cause
his painting crew to work in dangerous proximity to the high
tension wires, without the protection of competent electrical
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mechanics; that on the day of the fatal accident the deceased
was a member of the painting crew that was "negligently
directed by the defendants'' Williams and Phillips to paint
the tower which was in dangerous proximity to the high tension wires.
. A verified claim for damages stating the necessary information was filed with the city clerk on October 8, 1948, by the
plaintiff widow. The complaint does not allege that any claim
for damages was presented to or served upon the defendants
or any of them, and they received no actual notice that an
action would be brought against them prior to the service
of the complaint in this action.
Section 1981 of the Government Code provides: "Whenever it is claimed that any person has been injured or any
property damaged as the result of the negligence or carelessness of any public officer or employee occurring during
the course of his service or employment . . . within 90 days
after the accident has occurred a verified claim for damages
shall be presented in writip.g and filed with the officer or
employe() and the clerk~ secretary of the legislative boay
of the . . . municipality . . . ''
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that section 1981 does
_not apply to actions for wrongful death. It may not be denied
.th.at if that section does apply to wrongful death cases a
. verified claim must be presented to an employee sought to be
charged within 90 days after the accident. In Veriddo v.
Renaud, 35 Cal.2d 263, it was said, at page 265 [217 P.2d
647], that by section 1981 the Legislature "has extended to
public officers and employees, who incur liability in the performance of government service, the protection of a claims
statute and the privilege of having defended at public ex. pense those damage suits which are enumerated'' in the code.
This court cited with approval the case of Huffaker v. Decker,
77 Cal.App.2d 383 [175 P.2d 254], in which the defendant
city employee was sued for damages allegedly caused by the
· negligent driving of an automobile owned by the city and
driven within the scope of the defendant's employment. It
~vas held that the failure of the plaintiff to allege compliance
with the claim provisions of section 1981 was fatal to his cause
of action.
The plaintiffs contend that the section contemplates only a
. cl:iim on behalf of the person injured; that an heir under
"the death sta,tute can in no sense be deemed to be the person
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injured; that this concept is fortified by the use of the words
"&fter the accident has occurred," and that thus the time
of death as the time of the accident is excluded.
[1] In an analogous situation this court has held that
an heir of the deceased is a person injured within the terms
~of the death statute. In Arellano v. City of Burbank, 13 Cal.
2d 248 [89 P.2d 113], the liability of the municipality in a
wrongful death case pursuant to the Public Liability Act
of 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 675; Gov. Code, § 53051), was sustained. Section 2 of the act there under consideration provided that in certain cases municipalities should be liable for
"~njuries" jo persons and property resulting from dangerous
or defective condition of public streets. In holding that the
statute authorized the city's liability for wrongful death this
court at page 258 cited and quoted with approval from Bennett v. Kings County, 124 Cal.App. 147, where it was said
at page 150 [12 P.2d 47] : "Aside from the consideration of
any other statutes, we are unable to see why the 'injuries to
pers011s', referred to in this statute, do not include such inturies as may be caused to persons by reason of the death of
others as well as injuries to persons directly involved not
resulting in death. We think the injury suffered by these
plaintiffs is covered by the statute and that the demurrer
was properly overruled.''
A .different intent should not be attributed to the use of
the same language in another section. An intent to include
liability for injuries to persons and property flowing
from wrongful death is read from the language in the section
.imposing liability. An intent to exclude the obligation to file
a claim due to such injuries may not therefore be read from
the similar language in section 1981 of the Government Code.
As used in that section the language likewise is plain and
.sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that the Legislature intended it to have the same meaning in each section.
That language, referring to injuries to person and property,
must be deemed to be all inclusive in both sections.
The Arellano case was decided in 1939. That a sufficient
claim is required in cases of wrongful death has been thereafter assumed. (See Cooper v. County of Butte, 17 Cal.App.
2d 43 [61 P.2d 516]; Huey v. City of Los Angeles, 137 Cal.
App. 48 [29 P.2d 918] ; Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115
Cal.App. 122 [300 P. 993] .) With this construction placed
upon the section the Legislature has not seen fit to change
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the statutory requirements of presenting a claim in wrongful
death cases.
[2] It is contended by the plaintiff that section 1981
applies only in cases of alleged "negligence and carelessness,"
that this complaint alleges something more in that the word
''wilful'' appears in one allegation and thereby excludes the
cause of action from the operation of the section. 'l'his contention may not prevail. As above indicated it is alleged
that by failing to take proper precautions to protect the
painting crew the defendants "in violation, neglect and disregard of their various duties and responsibilities as ofiicers
and employees of said Department of Water and Power,
carelessly and negligently failed to take any steps to remedy
the same'' ; that the deceased was a member of a painting
crew that "was negligently" directed by the defendants to
paint one of the towers. As to the defendant A. J. 0 'Connor
alone it is alleged that "in wilful, negligent and reckless"
disregard of the lives and limbs of his crew, he had followed
the practice of working and did cause his painting crew
to work in dangerous proximity to said high tension wires;
and that 0 'Connor's "practice" was with the knowledge,
consent, authority and direction of his codefendants. Taking
into consideration the complaint as a whole, wherein the same
acts are alleged to constitute negligence and carelessness on
the part of all of the defendants, the pleading states a cause
of action based on negligence within the meaning of section
1981 and would be sufiicient as such as against the general
demurrer, but for the intervention of the claims statute.
It is also urged that section 1981 is not applicable
to this case because when death occurs as a result of the
tortious act the time for presenting the claim is too uncertain.
'l'he section provides that the claim must be presented within
90 days after the ''accident has occurred.'' It is argued
that the ''accident'' is the occurrence causing the injury and
that the injured party may die more than 90 days after
the event causing the injury, thus making compliance with
the time element impossible. It is unnecessary here to determine whether the word "accident" as found in the statute
should be held to refer to the event that gave rise to the injury to the plaintiffs, namely, the death of the deceased, for
the purpose of determining the commencement of the statutory period. Since the plaintiffs filed no claim at all against
the defendants, a determination in that respect would not
resolve any issue in this case.
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It is concluded that the attempted cause of action against
the defendants is based on negligence; that section 1981 is
applicable; and that failure to comply therewith is fatal.
Under these circumstances it does not appear that the complaint could be amended to state a cause of action.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
There can be no doubt that the various statutes imposing
liability on government agencies include liability for wrongful death as well as injuries to persons and property and
that they extend to cases where the injury is inflicted intentionally, wilfully, or through gross negligence as well as
negligence. The claim statutes, however, do not cover the
wrongful death actions. The subject is ably discussed by
Mr. Presiding Justice White of the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division One, in an opinion prepared by him
when this case was before that court, which I adopt as my
dissent, as follows:
''A general demurrer to their amended complaint (hereinafter referred to as the complaint) having been sustained
without leave to amend, plaintiffs have appealed from the
ensuing judgment of dismissal. The action is one for wrongful death brought by the widow and minor children of
Joseph 'r. Ward. The decedent met his death by coming in
contact with a high tension electric transmission line while
engaged as a painter in painting a tower at an electrical
substation of the Department of Water and Power of the City
of Los Angeles. The decedent was an employee of the department and the defendants were fellow employees having varying degrees of supervision over or connection with the work
of painting the tower. The complaint alleged, in substance,
that it was extremely dangerous for a painter to work on the
tower in the vicinity of the high-voltage wires, and that reasonable care required that the current be turned off while
:-mch work went on; that there be two competent electricians
present at all times; that no painters, nor any equipment
except of a nonconducting quality be permitted within 10
feet of the wires while they were energized; that safety belts
be used. It was charged that the defendants, in violation,
neglect and disregard of their duties as officers and employees
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of the department, carelessly and negligently failed to take
such precautions; further that defendants 0 'Connor and Williams, as foreman and assistant foreman of the painting crew,
caused an electrical mechanic to be removed from the job in
order to expedite the work by omitting the precautions insisted upon by the electrical mechanic and thereafter, 'in
willful, negligent and reckless disregard of the lives and
limbs of members of said crew, adopted the practice of working and did cause his painting crew to work in dangerous
proximity to said high tension wires,' and 'to the knowledge
and with the consent and authority and pursuant to the directions of' the other defendants.
''The demurrer was based upon the sole ground that the
complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs presented a verified claim to the defendants within 90 days from the date of
the accident. The complaint in this connection contained
the following allegation: 'That on October 8, 1948, plaintiff
Aileen Mary \Vard filed a written verified claim for damages
with the City of Los Angeles, State of California, by filing
same with Walter Peterson, City Clerk of said City; that
said claim for damages specified the names and addresses of
the claimants, the nature of the damages and injuries, when
and where the injuries occurred, and a description of the
manner and nature of the accident and injuries.'
''Section 1981 of the Government Code reads as follows :
" 'Whenever it is claimed that any person has been injured
or any property damaged as a result of the negligence or
carelessness of any public officer or employee occurring during the course of his service or employment or as a result of
the dangerous or defective condition of any public property,
alleged to be due to the negligence or carelessness of any officer
or employee, within 90 days after the accident has occurred
a verified claim for damages shall be presented in writing
and filed with the officer or employee and the clerk or secretary of the legislative body of the school district, county,
or municipality, as the case may be. In the case of a State
officer the claim shall be filed with the officer and the
Governor.'
"Appellants present three reasons why, they assert, the
causes of action here involved do not come within the requirements of the aforesaid section 1981: 1. That an action for
wrongful death is not included within the wording of the section, which refers only to situations where 'it is claimed
that any person has been injured or any property damaged';
2. That the section by its terms does not include cases involv-
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ing wilful misconduct, appellants here contending that they
have set forth a cause of action for wilful misconduct rather
than mere negligence ; and 3. That the statute should not be
construed to include an action by an injured employee against
a fellow employee.
·
''.As a fourth ground of reversal, appellants assert that
even though section 1981 should be held applicable in the instant action, their filing of a claim with the city clerk of the
city of Los .Angeles should be held to constitute substantial
compliance.
'' 'rhe majority view of the courts of other jurisdictions as
reflected in cases we consider as exceptionally well reasoned,
is that statutes containing language similar to that involved
in the section here under consideration do not apply to an
actim1 for wrongful death. The language of the Supreme
Court of Missouri in Glasgow v. City of St. Joseph (1944),
353 Mo. 740, 748 [184 S.W.2d 412, 416], is illustrative: 'Unless actions for death by wrongful act, are explicitly included,
it is generally held that like statutory provisions do not apply
to an action for wrongful death. This is especially so where,
as in Missouri' (and as in California), 'the wrongful death
action is considered a new cause of action, first springing into
existence at the time of death.' (Citing 25 C.J.S., p. 1102,
§ 30, subsection a; 38 .Am.Jur., p. 392, § 688; 6 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, p. 1285, § 2890, n. 12; Annotation,
64 .A.L.R. 1059.)
"The case of Spangler's Administrator v. City of Middlesbm·o ( 1945), 301 Ky. 237 [191 S.W.2d 414], involved a statute
providing that 'No action shall be maintained against any
city . . . unless notice . . . be filed within ninety days of
the occurrence for which damage is claimed. . . . ' The court
there pointed out that where an injured party dies, the
usual necessity for prompt examination to determine exact extent of injuries is obviated and the coroner's inquest provides the city with ample notice for the purpose of eliminating for the future the dangerous condition which caused
the death. But further, as pointed out by the Kentucky
court, the notice is required to be filed within 90 days of the
'occurrence' for which damages are claimed. The California
statute uses the word 'accident.' Clearly, so far as an action
for personal injuries is concerned, the words 'occurrence'
and 'accident' mean the same thing-the incident or event
causing the personal injuries, such as the incident of a collision of automobiles, the incident of falling into an excava-
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tion, etc.) As stated in the last cited case, if it were held
that notice were necessary to the maintenance of an action
for wrongful death, the action would be barred where the
'injury '--that is the 'accident' or 'occurrence' occurred more
than 90 days before death.
''The language of the Suprerne Court of Vermont in Bigelow v. Town of St. Johnsbury (1918), 92 Vt. 423 [105 A. 34],
is here appropf'iate: 'It is argued that . . . persons financially injured through the death of their next of kin must
give notice the same as they would be required to give if they
were themselves physically injured. The absurdity of such
a construction is manifest from its logical result. If a person injured is, in consequence thereof, bereft of his reason,
and the injuries result in his death 21 days after the occurrence of such injury, no action can be held or maintained,
under the statute, for the benefit of the next of kin, because
notice was not given within 20 days of the time of the injury,
during all which time the injured person was yet alive. An
absurd purpose is not to be attributed to the lawmakers, and
a construction leading to an absurd consequence must always
be avoided.'
''Another Vermont case illustrative of the difficulties that
would be involved were the statute held applicable is Eames
v. Town of Brattleboro (1882), 54 Vt. 471, where the person
injured died within half an hour after the accident. Recovery was sought on behalf of two minor daughters, no claim
or notice having been filed. The court said: 'We think there
is no room for doubt that no notice was required in this
case. The language is plain and the effect of it unmistakable. The "person injured", as used in the proviso, refers
to the person injured in the accident, not to the person injured pecuniarily, as a result of the accident.'
'' vVe will refer further to the meaning in section 1981 of
the words 'whenever it is claimed that any person has been
injured' in discussing respondents' contentions with respect
to the applicability of the statute.
''Other cases holding typical claims statutes to be inapplicable to wrongful death actions, many involving statutes containing much broader language than that involved in the
instant case, are D1~ariotti v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (1914),
262 Mo. 1 [170 S.W. 865] ; Nesbit v. City of Topeka (1912),
87 Kan. 394 [124 P. 166, 40 L.R.A. N.S. 749]; Orth v. Belgrade (1902), 87 Minn. 237 [91 N.W. 843]; Senecal v. City of
West St. Pattl (1910), 111 Minn. 253 [126 N.W. 826]; Parish
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v. Eden (1885), 62 Wis. 272 [22 N.W. 399]; McKeigue v.
City of Janewille (1887), 68 Wis. 50 [31 N.W. 298]; Laconte
v. City of Kenosha (1912), 149 Wis. 343 [135 N.W. 843];
Knight v. Town of Haverhill (1915), 77 N.H. 487 [93 A. 663];
Perkins v. Oxford (1877), 66 lVfe. 545; Prouty v. City of Chicago (1911), 250 Ill. 222 [95 N.E. 147]; Devine v. City of
Chicago (1911), 166 Ill.App. 17.
''Respondents urge that the language 'person . . . injured'
includes injury resulting from the wrongful death of another, and that this view is supported by the interpretations,
expressed or assumed, of similar language in related statutes,
in decisions of the courts of this state. In this connection, it is
said that the various statutes 1 on the subject of the liability
of cities, public agencies, and their officers, and the filing of
claims therefor, 'must all be read together and so construed,
the liability of a city or its agents must be determined and
the procedure therein set forth must be followed.' (Yonker
v. City of San Gab1·iel, 23 Cal.App.2d 556 [73 P.2d 623].
See also Shannon v. Fleishhacker, 116 Cal.App. 258 [2 P.2d
835]; Douglass v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 123 [53 P.2d
353] ; Ansell v. City of San Diego, 35 Cal.2d 76 [216 P.2d 455] ;
Jackson v. City of Santa Monica, 13 Cal.App.2d 376 [57 P.2d
226]; Tyree v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal.App.2d 182 [206
P.2d 912].)
"Section 53051 of the Government Code (formerly Stats.
1923, p. 675) provides that counties, municipalities and school
districts 'shall be liable for injuries to persons and property. . . . ' In Arellano v. City of Bttrbank, 13 Cal.2d 248
[ 89 P .2d 113], it was expressly held that 'injuries to persons'
referred to in the statute, include such injuries as may be
caused to persons by reason of the death of others. Further
it is pointed out by respondents, in such cases as Douglass v.
City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2c1123 [53 P.2d 353], and Spencer
v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 267 [49 P.2d 320], it was
held that a recovery could not be had under the provisions
of section 53051 of the Government Code unless a claim is
filed as required by section 53052 of the same code, which lat1
"
Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 675), making cities and other public
agencies liable for negligence in certain instances. Now substantially
incorporated in section 53051, Government Code.
"Act of 1919 (Stats. 1919, p. 756), relating to liability of officers
of cities and other public agencies. Now incorporated in section 1953,
Government Code.
·
''Act of 1931 (Stats. 1931, p. 2475), requiring filing of claims with
clerk of the legislative body of a city or public agency. Now section
53052, Government Code.''
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ter section provides (as does section 1981), 'Whenever it is
claimed that a person has been injured . . . a . . . claim
for damages shall be . . . filed . . . . ' However, no case has
been found in which it has been squarely held that a claim
must be filed under section 53052 in a death action arising
under section 53051. Respondents urge that since these pertinent statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 1981, 1953, 53051 and 53052)
were reenacted as part of the Government Code after the decision in Arellano v. City of Burbank, supra, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended them to apply to death
cases.
"The cases of Dillard v. County of Kern, 23 Cal.2d 271 [144
P.2d 365, 150 A.L.R. 1048], and Shannon v. Fleishhacker, 116
Cal.App. 258 [2 P.2d 835], are of no particular assistance in
the solution of the question here presented. The former case
involved section 4075 of the Political Code, which required
that 'all claims' against a county should be presented as
therein provided, while in the latter case the court was concerned with whether the plaintiff had proved the elements
of liability required under the statute then in force ( Stats.
1919, p. 756; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5618). The same
is true with reference to cases involving wrongful death
actions against the city of Los Angeles (Beeson v. City of Los
Angeles, 115 Cal.App. 122 [300 P. 993] ; Htley v. City of Los
Angeles, 137 Cal.App. 48 [29 P.2d 918]), as these cases involv~d a charter provision that 'No suit shall be brought on
any claim . . . · until a demand for the same has been presented . . . . '
''Thus, while a statute imposing liability for 'injuries to
persons' has been construed to include liability for wrongful
death (Arellano v. City of Burbank, supra, and cases cited),
and while it has been sometimes assumed that a statute
requiring the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to suit includes a suit for wrongful death, in no case has it been held
that the provisions of section 1981, requiring the filing of a
claim 'whenever it is claimed that any person has been injured . . . within 90 days after the accident has occurred'
apply to a wrongful death situation. Nor does it necessarily
follow that because the phrase 'injuries to persons' as used
in a statute imposing liability has been construed to include
wrongful death, the language of section 1981 should be construed to require the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to the
maintenance of an action for wrongful death.
"It is manifest from the plain wording of section 1981
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that it was the intention of the Legislature to qualify the
common law right of action against the negligent person by
requiring the filing of a verified claim only in the event the
injured person claims that he has been injured as a result
of the negligence of a public employee occurring during the
course of the latter's public employment. Had it been the
intention of the Legislature to extend the provisions of this
section to another, new and different cause of action which
comes into existence at the time of death of the injured
person, appropriate language could, and no doubt would, have
been used. Courts should not, under the guise of judicial
interpretation, attempt to add to or detract from the legislative intent as expressed in the words of a statute. This is
especially true when, as the Supreme Court said in the recent
case of Stewart v. McCollister, 37 Cal.2d 203, 207 [231 P.2d
48], 'The several claims statutes and charter provisions prescribing varying requirements concerning the length of time
for the filing of verified claims, the contents thereof, and the
manner of filing or presentation may well be said to have
become traps for the unwary. No additional trap sbould be
added by an unwarranted construction of said section 1981.'
We are unwilling to give our imprimatur to a strained construction of the section by applying it to a cause of action
which, from a reading of the section's terms, is not included
within its purview.
''In view of the foregoing conclusion at which we have
arrived, we deem it unnecessary to discuss or decide other
points made and issues raised upon this appeal.
''The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with
directions to the court below to overrule the demurrer and
try the cause upon the merits."
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment.
EDMONDS, J.-I am in agreement with the conclusions
of the District Court of Appeal that a cause of action for
wrongful death does not come within the purview of the
claim statute and the judgment should be reversed. The
reasoning of that court made unnecessary discussion of other
questions presented by the parties. However, the contrary
conclusion now reached upon the applicability of the statute
to a cause of action for wrongful death requires consideration of the contention that the statute also is inapplicable to
a cause of action based upon wanton and reckless misconduct. The question should not be evaded upon the ground
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that the complaint states a cause of action for negligence
alone and could not be amended to state one for wanton
and reckless misconduct.
As I read the complaint, the opinion does not accurately
summarize the plaintiffs' allegations. According to the pleading, it was extremely dangerous for a painter to work on the
towers in the vicinity of ''hot wires'' and certain specialized
safety precautions were required. None of these precautions
was observed. The electrical mechanic assigned to the job
''insisted on certain necessary precautions . . . which if taken
would somewhat slow down the painting job and increase its
costs." O'Connor, the complaint continues, "for the purpose of being able to proceed with said job with such expedition and cost as he desired, caused the removal of said Electrical Mechanic from the job, and thereafter, in willful, negligent and reckless disregard of the lives and limbs of members of said crew, adopted the practice of working and did
cause his painting crew to work in dangerous proximity to
said high tension wires, without the aforesaid protection of
competerrt Electrical Mechanics, to the knowledge and with
the consent and authority and pursuant to the directions'' of
the other defendants.
The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a
cause of action for wanton and reckless misconduct. ''A tort
having some of the characteristics of both negligence and
willfulness occurs when a person with no intent to cause
harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and
dangerous that he knows, or should know, it is highly
probable that harm will result. (Rest. Torts, § 500 et seq.;
Prosser, Torts, pp. 260, 261.) · Such a tort has been labeled 'willful negligence,' 'wanton and willful negligence,'
'wanton and willful misconduct,' and even 'gross negligence.' It is most accurately designated as wanton and
reckless misconduct. It involves no intention, as does willful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from negligence in
that it does involve an intention to perform an act that the
actor knows, or should know, will very probably cause harm.
(Citations.) Wanton and reckless misconduct is more closely
akin to willful misconduct than to negligence, and it has most
of the legal consequences of willful misconduct. Thus, it justifies an award of punitive damages, and contributory negligence by the plaintiff is not a defense." (Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal.2d 863, 869-870 [118 P.2d 465] .)
As examples of conduct which is in reckless disregard of
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the safety of another, the Donnelly case cites New York Central R. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152 [40 S.Ct. 287, 64 L.Ed.
502], involving a collision between railroad trains after the
engineer of one had run his train past two separate danger
signals. Another example given is the operation of a bus over
a dangerous railroad crossing at a rate of 55 to 60 miles
per hour. (Virgin1:a Beach Bus Line v. Campbell, 73 F.2d
97.) "Such conduct constitutes more than negligence. It
is a dangerous act performed intentionally with the knowledge that it will probably cause harm." (Donnelly v. Sottthern Pac. Co., supra, p. 870.)
In Vega Aircraft v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 529,
[ 165 P .2d 665], a finding of "serious and wilful misconduct
of the employer" by the commission was upheld on evidence
which showed a failure by supervisory employees to take the
proper safety precautions in conducting experimental work
of an extremely dangerous nature. The court said: ''Serious
and wilful misconduct is conduct which the employer knew,
or should have known, was likely to result in serious injury
or which evinced reckless disregard for the safety of the
employe." (Pp. 533-534.)
''Serious and willful misconduct is conduct that the employer knew, or should have known, was likely to cause serious injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for
the safety of others. (Citations.) It has been held repeatedly
that the employment of workmen under dangerous conditions
that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless disregard
for their safety. (Citations.) The test under these cases
is whether the employer knowingly or willfully committed
an act that he knew or should have known was likely to cause
harm to his employee." (Parkhttrst v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
20 Cal.2d 826, 829-830 [129 P.2d 113] ; Hatheway v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 13 Cal.2d 377, 381 [90 P.2d 68] .)
The complaint in this case alleges all of the elements necessary to constitute the tort of ''wanton and reckless misconduct," as it is called in the Donnelly case, supra, or of "wilful misconduct,'' the designation more generally applied to
it in the decisions and statutes. (Rest., Torts, § 500, special
note.) Here the defendants, it is alleged, knew the danger
and deliberately failed to provide, or even removed, the proper
safety procedures. This is far more than a simple allegation
of negligence although negligence may be included within the
scope of the pleading. If the facts alleged are proved, a judg39 C.2d-25
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ment based upon wanton and reckless misconduct would be
warranted. The situation is not one where the plaintiffs attempt to evade the claim statute by formally alleging that
negligent acts also were "wilful." They allege all of the facts
necessary to support a finding of wilful misconduct. This belies the implication of the majority opinion that the allegation of wilfullness was mere formalism.
Even if it may correctly be concluded that the complaint
states a canse of action for negligence only, it is obvious
from the facts alleged that the plaintiffs could state a cause
of action for wanton and reckless misconduct. "Unless it is
clear that a complaint does not state a cause of action and cannot be so amended as to obviate the objections thereto it is
error to refuse permission to amend." (Hillman v. Hillman
Land Co., 81 Cal..App.2d 174, 181 [183 P.2d 730]; People v.
Tur·lock Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 200 Cal. 546, 550 [253 P. 1108] ;
Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441, 447-448 [95 P. 895] ; Photochart
v. Del Riccio, 94 Cal.App.2d 315,319 [210 P.2d 547].) Under
the circumstances, the general demurrer should not have been
sustained without leave to amend.
By basing the judgment upon the conclusion that the complaint states a cause of action for negligence only, the majority implicitly concede that wilful misconduct is not included within the provisions of section 1981 of the Government
Code. No other interpretation of the statute is possible. By
its express terms, it applies only to ''negligence or carelessness." "Wilful misconduct" is not included.
Statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly
construed. (McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 282 [70 P.2d
909] ; Gallet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 70 [290 P. 438] .) At
common law, the public employee was liable for his tortious
act. (Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 789 [127 P. 50] ; Doeg
v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 216-217 [58 P. 707, 77 Am.St.Rep.
171]; cf. Elliott v. County of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 472, 474
[191 P. 899] ; Moore v. Burton, 75 Cal.App. 395, 401 [242 P.
902] .) Government Code, section 1981, places a procedural
requirement upon the maintenance of the previously existing
cause of action. (Veriddo v. Renaud, 35 Cal.2d 263, 266
[217 P.2d 647]; Huffaker v. Decker, 77 Cal.App.2d 383, 389
[175 P.2d 254].) This limitation upon the common law cause
of action should be strictly construed and not extended
to causes of action other than those specifically encompassed
within the terms of the statute.
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This court consistently ,has followed the general rule that
"wilful misconduct" is much more than "negligence." It
is the intentional doing of an act, rather than failure to perform a duty. The distinction is basic, not merely technical.
The two types of conduct are essentially different. "Wilful
misconduct'' is not ''negligence.'' As recently as Benton v.
Sloss, 38 Cal.2d 399, 403 [240 P.2d 575], the court, interpreting Vehicle Code sections 402 and 403, distinguished between
"negligence" and "wilful misconduct," holding that the
latter is not included within the former.
The Benton case relies upon Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d
226 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407], which reviews at length
the cases distinguishing the two separate types of conduct.
There, the court was faced with the question whether "wilful
misconduct" in section 141% of the Vehicle Act (now Veh.
Code, § 403) is the same as "negligence" in section 1714%
of the Civil Code (now Veh. Code, § 402). It held that the
two types of conduct were different. In reaching its conclusion, it relied upon cases drawing the distinction in the
general field of tort law as well as upon decisions construing
the motor vehicle statutes. To emphasize its point that the
Legislature understood the difference, it mentioned in passing
the use of both "negligence" and "wilful misconduct" in
Vehicle Code, section 352, relating to liability for the acts
of a minor.
Civil Code, section 1714, draws the distinction between
the two types of conduct by separately describing acts giving
rise to liability. It provides : "Everyone is responsible, not
only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought
the injury upon himself . . . . "
Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, provides a graphic
explanation of the difference between negligence and wilful
misconduct and of the varying degrees of negligence. The
question involved was whether certain actions constituted
wilful misconduct, the only basis upon which liability could
be predicated, or whether they were merely negligence, even
though of a high degree. The court said: "Negligence is an
unintentional tort, a failure to exercise the degree of care
in a given situation that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would exercise to protect others from harm.
(Citations.) A negligent person has no desire to cause the
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harm that results from his carelessness (citation), and he
must be distinguished from a person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and battery, who intends to cause
harm. (Citation.) Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms. (Citations.) If conduct is negligent, it is not
willful; if it is willful, it is not negligence." (P. 869.) Otherwise stated, the conduct being considered, said the court, may
have been ''gross'' under the California rule, but it constituted negligence and not wanton and reckless misconduct.
Prior to the adoption of chapter 1168, Statutes of 1931,
upon which section 1981 is based, the distinction between
"negligence" and "wilful misconduct" had been clearly
drawn by the courts. In MaLone v. Clemow, 111 Cal.App. 13
[295 P. 70], it was said: "We should not confuse 'gross
negligence' with 'willful misconduct,' because there is a clear
distinction between the two terms." (P. 17.) Reviewing the
authorities, the court held that "whenever the element of
knowledge and wilfulness enters into the act, it ceases to be
negligence, and becomes at least 'willful misconduct,' and this
is true no matter what degree of negligence is being considered." (P. 17.)
"When the scope and meaning of words or phrases in a
statute have been repeatedly interpreted by the courts, there
is some indication that the use of them in a subsequent statute
in a similar setting carries with it a like construction.''
(Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 93 [207 P.2d 47]; City of
Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184, 191 [44 P.2d 305].) The
frequent definitions of "negligence" as distinguished from
"wilful misconduct," and the application of the definition to
liability "resulting from negligence" in section 17141~ of
the Civil Code (now Veh. Code, § 402,) indicate a legislative
intent to give a similar construction to "as a result of the
negligence'' in section 1981.
Therefore, even if it may correctly be held that a cause
of action for wrongful death is included within the terms of
the statute, the demurrer was sustained improperly. The
complaint is based upon a cause of action for wanton and
recklf'ss misconduct, for which no claim is required.
For this reason, as well as those stated by the District
Court of Appeal, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
20. 1952. Edmonds, J .. and Carter, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

